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INTRODUCTION 
The American judiciary is suffering from a terrible affliction: bi­
ased judges. I am not talking about the subconscious or unconscious 
biases-stemming from different backgrounds, experiences, ideolo­
gies, etc.-that everyone, including judges, harbors. 1 Rather, I am 
describing invidious, improper biases that lead judges to favor one 
litigant over another for reasons that almost everyone would agree 
should play no role in judicial decision-making: the desire to repay a 
debt of gratitude to those who helped the judge get elected and be re­
elected.2 
The bias problem is pervasive and affects more than just a few 
bad apples. Almost ninety percent of state court judges must face elec­
* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. 
REv. 493, 497 (2013) ("Judges have long been characterized as human beings subject 
to human prejudices .... If perfect impartiality is unattainable, the more pragmatic 
objective is to ensure that judges are 'impartial enough' to fulfill the role assigned 
them under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law."). The view that 
judges act as mere umpires, without allowing any preconceptions to shape their deci­
sions, has largely been discredited. See, e.g., Theodore A. McKee, Judges as 
Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1709 (2007) (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's use of 
the metaphor during his confirmation hearing). 
2. These biases and the reasons for their existence are discussed infra Part I. 
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tion to obtain or retain their office.3 These judges are not low-level 
bureaucrats handling the administration of parking tickets; rather, they 
handle the most important issues that arise in our legal system, like 
constitutional rights,4 voting rights,5 and criminal law.6 Our entire le­
gal system depends on judges who decide cases according to the law. 
As judges and scholars have often recognized, an impartial judiciary is 
at the core of the American justice system and is one of the central 
pillars of a constitutional democracy.7 
Judicial elections themselves are nothing new, having been 
around for over 150 years. 8 For at least three decades, we have sus­
pected that elected judges are biased judges.9 Recent empirical evi­
dence of judicial bias has overwhelmingly confirmed our worst fears, 
and study after study has shown that elected judges systematically 
favor certain groups (contributors, in-state litigants, or groups taking a 
popular political position, for example) while disfavoring others (in 
particular, out-of-state litigants, criminal defendants, and litigants ar­
guing unpopular political positions). 10 These biases have been exacer­
bated by a major transformation in judicial elections themselves, 
3. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1077, 1105 app. 2 (2007). 
4. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977) 
(discussing state court enforcement of federal constitutional rights). 
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 
(2009) (highlighting extensive litigation involving issues of election administration 
and voting rights in state courts). 
6. See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: "Tough on Crime," Soft on 
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 317 (2010). 
7. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (discussing the importance 
of a fair trial in a fair tribunal); J. Thomas Greene, The Rule of !Aw-Endangered?, 
225 F.R.D. 29, 29 (2004) ("[A] fundamental hallmark of the Rule of Law is that our 
system of rights, remedies and procedures is to be administered by an independent and 
impartial judiciary."). 
8. The most thorough history of judicial elections, including the reasons for their 
adoption, is JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, Tm~ PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING Jurn­
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012). Shugerman explains that judicial elections 
became popular in the 1850s when a financial crisis led voters to conclude that judges 
should be more independent of state legislatures. Id. at 123-43. But see Jona Gold­
schmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. I, 5-6 (1994) (suggesting that judicial elections were part of the Jacksonian 
movement toward more democratic institutions). 
9. The concerns about the impartiality of elected judges began to grow especially 
in the 1980s as judicial elections started to evolve. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Note, 
Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. 
L. REv. 449, 465 n.87 (1988) (discussing concerns about biased elected judges); Mark 
Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and 
Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial 
Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 M1cH. L. REV. 382 (1987). 
10. See infra Part I for a discussion of that evidence. 
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which have gone from "sleepy" and "low-key" to "wild" and 
"politicized" in a span of a couple decades. 11 This means that our 
debates about judicial bias will only intensify as judicial elections 
continue to evolve. 12 
If we accept the overwhelming evidence of judicial bias-and I 
believe we have no other choice given its sheer volume-we are left 
with an important question: how well does our approach to judicial 
bias address the problem? Generally, recusal has been our primary 
solution to concerns about partial judges. If a judge is biased or if 
there is so much as an appearance of bias, the judge must recuse him­
self from the case. 13 Recusal is the solution offered by the state and 
federal recusal statutes, state codes of judicial conduct, and even by 
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in recent cases involving judi­
cial elections, including Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White 14 and 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 15 As we commemorate the five­
year anniversary of the Caperton decision, it is a good time to evalu­
ate whether recusal has worked (and can work) to eliminate election­
related judicial bias. In this Article, I argue that recusal alone has not 
only failed to ensure judicial impartiality, but also is an inadequate 
solution to the problem of judicial bias. 
Part I of this Article will explain how three fundamental changes 
in the nature of judicial elections have created a major concern about 
judicial bias. The first is the spending explosion in judicial races. 16 
Modern judicial elections require judges to raise significant amounts 
of money to get elected or re-elected. Who gives judges that money? 
Frequently, it is the very litigants and lawyers who are most likely to 
11. See Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 
699, 723-24 (2013) ("Although judicial elections have traditionally been assumed to 
be sleepy, uncompetitive, and low-profile events ... many recent judicial elections 
have been highly visible and effective methods for influencing policy, mobilizing is­
sue advocacy, and unseating judges."). 
12. See David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 CoLUM. L. REV. 265 
(2008). 
13. For federal judges, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2013) requires recusal whenever the 
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." State court judges are gov­
erned by codes of judicial conduct that use similar, if not identical, language. See 
MODEL CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.l 1(A) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011); see also John 
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 
238 (1987) ("Courts declare that impartiality is so important that a reasonable-albeit 
incorrect-appearance of bias compels recusal ...."). 
14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
15. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
16. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations ofJudicial 
Campaign Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1248 (2013) ("With the increase in 
competitiveness of judicial elections, campaign spending has skyrocketed."). 
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appear in front of those judges when they take the bench. 17 As a result, 
judges frequently hear cases where at least one of the parties or one of 
the lawyers either contributed to the judge's campaign or made an 
independent expenditure to support the judge's campaign.18 In addi­
tion, judges who want to keep their jobs will have to raise more 
money in the future, likely forcing them to consider how their deci­
sions will be perceived by their donors and special interest groups. 19 
The second cause of judicial bias stems from the promises that 
judges make on the campaign trail. The Supreme Court in White held 
that judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to announce 
their views on controversial legal issues.2 ° Following this decision, 
special interest groups now often send judicial candidates question­
naires asking them to take positions on issues important to those 
groups.21 As a result, judges frequently exercise that First Amendment 
right, and so they come into office with promises to keep.22 A failure 
to keep those promises can have costly consequences in a future judi­
17. See Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic 
Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 474 (2002) 
("Often, lawyers or litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large 
proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates."). 
18. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) ("It is an unfortunate 
reality of judicial elections that judicial campaigns are often largely funded by law­
yers, many of whom will appear before the candidate who wins."). Unfortunately, we 
do not have adequate state-by-state data from every state to know precisely how often 
this happens. A recent American Judicature Society study of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that in sixty percent of cases, at least one of the litigants or law­
yers had contributed to the campaign of at least one justice. See Shira J. Goodman et 
al., What's More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial Independence? It's Time for 
Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DuQ. L. REV. 859, 865 (2010). 
19. One study has shown that state supreme court justices have "routinely ad­
just[ed] their rulings to attract votes and campaign money." See Joanna M. Shepherd, 
Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DuKE L.J. 623, 625 (2009). 
20. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2002). 
21. Goodman et al., supra note 18, at 869-70 (discussing the extensive use of ques­
tionnaires "seeking clear pronouncements of candidates' positions on controversial 
issues that often are the subject of litigation in the state courts"). 
22. Admittedly, the Court's decision in White only applied to "announcements," not 
"promises." White, 536 U.S. at 780. But as Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent: 
Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or 
promises is easily circumvented. By prefacing a campaign commitment 
with the caveat, "although I cannot promise anything," or by simply 
avoiding the language of promises or pledges altogether, a candidate 
could declare with impunity how she would decide specific issues. 
Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also George D. Brown, Political Judges and 
Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & 
MARYL. REY. 1543, 1598-99 (2008) ("After White, candidates can make pledges or 
promises by labeling them as announcements of views, even though the two are func­
tionally similar."). And some scholars have speculated that the ABA's commitments 
and promise clauses are also likely to be struck down by the Supreme Court. See 
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cial election. These are rarely rule-of-law promises-to uphold the 
law, to act impartially, to be fair and just. No, the promises that the 
public seeks, and that judges make, are promises to be tough on crime, 
to restrict (or protect) abortion rights, to take on (or stand with) plain­
tiffs' lawyers.23 
Finally, as judicial elections become more contested, judges feel 
increasing pressure to decide cases in accordance with public, as well 
as donor, preferences. This leads to bias against unpopular litigants 
and unpopular causes.24 This problem-termed "the majoritarian dif­
ficulty"25-is perhaps the most troubling for the justice system and 
the rule of law. When judges are forced to consider how a particular 
decision will affect the judge's own job prospects, judges may no 
longer act impartially.26 
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the promise of recusal as a 
solution to the judicial bias problem. Recusal is our tool of choice 
when it comes to addressing judicial bias; it is at the heart of state and 
federal rules of judicial conduct, as well as statutes regulating judicial 
bias.27 It is the tool that was offered by Supreme Court in Caperton, 
and scholars and judges have written extensively about recusal.28 Part 
Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re­
sponse to Judicial Campaign Speech, !04 CoLUM. L. REV. 563, 607-08 (2004). 
23. See Swisher, supra note 6, at 319-38 (discussing the incentives for judges to 
appear "tough on crime"); see also Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Coun­
tering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REv. 719, 734 (2010); Polly Simpson & 
Sally Weaver, Judicial Elections: Pollsters Want to Seat Far-Right Ideologues, AT­
LANTA J.-CoNsT., July 16, 2004, at A 13 (discussing the use of questionnaires to publi­
cize candidates' view on divisive social issues, including abortion, homosexuality, 
and school prayer). 
24. The most unpopular litigants are generally criminal defendants and out-of-state 
litigants. The causes that are unpopular depend on the state. These can be traditionally 
liberal or traditionally conservative causes, ranging from abortion rights to voting 
rights to tort reform. See infra Part I. 
25. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 689 (1995) (coining the term to describe the lack of 
independence and impartiality that elected judges suffer from because of the need to 
satisfy the electorate to obtain and retain their jobs). 
26. Grannis, supra note 9, at 418 ("[I]t may be that the best way to preserve the 
impartiality of elected judges is not to elect them."). 
27. In fact, there are at least three federal statutes that regulate judicial disqualifica­
tion. 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, 455 (2013). These statutes have been discussed exten­
sively in the literature, and I will only mention them in this Article in passing. Most 
states have also adopted recusal statutes. See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appear­
ances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 
538 n.24 (2005). 
28. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 27; Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Jus­
tice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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II will briefly discuss the recusal standards and practices in the states 
that elect judges. 
In Part ID, I conclude that recusal has failed to prevent biased 
judges from rendering judicial decisions. Indeed, I suggest that recusal 
cannot serve as the solution to the problem of biased judges. Part of 
the reason is that in most jurisdictions, it is the judge herself who must 
decide whether to recuse. It is foolhardy to put the recusal power in 
the hands of those most likely to be biased. But putting aside the pro­
cedural concern, recusal suffers from another fatal flaw. All elected 
judges must contend with the majoritarian difficulty outlined above 
and must worry about how their decisions will be 'perceived by the 
voters in the next election. That means that whoever replaces the re­
cused judge will necessarily be subject to the same majoritarian pres­
sures.29 Admittedly, recusal done right could eliminate the bias toward 
or against the immediate litigants, but even a perfectly implemented 
recusal procedure fails to account for the majoritarian difficulty 
altogether. 
I conclude with some thoughts on where we can go from here 
and discussion of whether there are other potential solutions to the 
problem of judicial bias. 
I. 
THE BIAS PROBLEM 
A. Sources of Bias 
Although judicial elections30 have been a part of our legal land­
scape for over 150 years, today's judicial elections look very little like 
their early predecessors. For decades, judicial elections were "sleepy" 
and "low-key"31 : Turnout and salience were low, while roll-off32 and 
29. Of course, if a state could ensure that the recused judge is replaced with a judge 
approaching retirement-or perhaps a judge who promises not to run for reelection­
this concern would be obviated. However, this is unlikely to be a workable solution, 
for it is unlikely that enough judges will be nearing retirement to handle any state's 
overcrowded docket. 
30. There are three kinds of judicial elections: partisan, non-partisan, and retention. 
Much has been written about these elections. See generally SHUGERMAN, supra note 
8, at 267-69. The differences are irrelevant to this article, as all three forms of judicial 
elections suffer from similar defects. This is also likely to become truer as retention 
elections become more competitive and incumbent candidates continue to suffer 
defeats as they have done in the past few years. See Pozen, supra note 12 (describing 
ways in which retention elections have become more competitive). 
31. SHUGERMAN, supra note 8, at 241; see also Richard Briffault, Public Funds and 
the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv. 819, 819 (2002) (explaining 
that judicial elections "were once low-key affairs, conducted with civility and dig­
nity"); David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State 
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incumbent retention rates were high.33 Today, judicial elections look 
very much like elections for legislative and executive offices: spend­
ing and salience are high, while incumbent retention rates have 
dropped. As a result of these changes, judicial elections have been 
described as either "nightmarish" or "healthy," depending on the au­
thor's point of view.34 These races are often very competitive, with 
substantial spending by the candidates and their supporters. Although 
the elections have been transformed in a number of different ways, 
there are three key changes I will highlight in this Part. These three 
changes, I argue, are the most important sources of increased judicial 
bias. 
1. The Corrupting Influence of Money 
The first bias-inducing change to judicial elections has to do with 
the explosion of money in judicial races. Money was not a major part 
of older judicial elections, and the elections were relatively inexpen­
sive, meaning that judges did not need to fundraise. 35 With few people 
contributing money to either sitting judges running for re-election or 
candidates for office, judges were less likely to hear cases involving 
contributors. There was little television advertising, which kept ex­
penses down.36 Independent expenditures were also less common.37 
And because judges often ran unopposed, 38 there was little need for 
sitting judges to spend their own money on their campaigns. 
Judicial Selection, 69 ALB. L. REv. 985, 985 (2006) ("Judicial selection is a histori­
cally sleepy affair ...."). 
32. Roll-off happens when voters cast their ballots for other races but fail to do so 
in a judicial race on the same ballot. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and 
Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 13, 19-20 (2003). 
33. Pozen, supra note 12, at 297 (discussing the historic pattern of high retention 
rates in judicial elections). As discussed infra, this pattern seems to be changing. 
34. Id. at 317 (discussing the notion that judicial elections are becoming "healthier 
than ever on many standard indices"); Schultz, supra note 31, at 985 ("[J]udicial elec­
tions may look increasingly more nightmarish ...."). 
35. SHUGERMAN, supra note 8, at 10 (describing earlier judicial election campaigns 
as "relatively inexpensive"). 
36. Today, television advertising is one of the most expensive components of a 
judicial election campaign. See Jordan M. Singer, Knowing ls Half the Battle: A Pro­
posal for Prospective Performance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LIT­
TLE RocK L. REv. 725, 731 (2007) ("In 2004, more than $24 million was spent on 
television ads in highest court races-one-fourth of all dollars raised by the 
candidates."). 
37. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 
977-78 (2001) (discussing the increases in campaign expenditures); Pozen, supra 
note 12, at 306 (arguing that "campaigns have become more expensive and 
competitive"). 
38. Pozen, supra note 12, at 267 ("Many incumbents ran unopposed."). 
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Today, these elections are very expensive. We have gone from 
spending almost nothing on judicial elections to spending approxi­
mately $83.3 million between 1990 and 1999, up to $206.9 million 
from 2000 to 2009.39 Seemingly, records for the amounts of money 
being raised and spent are broken every new election cycle.40 As a 
result of this transformation, judges spend significant amounts of time 
and energy raising money. Certainly, a reelection campaign is no 
longer a one-person endeavor.41 
This rise in spending has significant implications for judicial im­
partiality. Because there are now many contributors and spenders, 
judges frequently hear cases involving parties (or attorneys) who 
helped them get elected.42 For example, a recent Pennsylvania study 
showed that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the state supreme 
court in 2008 and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm 
that contributed to the campaign of at least one of the justices.43 This 
should come as no surprise, as it is precisely the parties that are most 
likely to appear in front of a judge who have the most interest in cur­
rying the judge's favor with campaign contributions or independent 
expenditures.44 
39. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDI­
CIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE I, 8 (2010), http://www.brennan 
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf. 
40. See Singer, supra note 36, at 730-3 I (discussing record-breaking campaigns in 
judicial elections throughout the United States). 
41. See Pozen, supra note 12, at 306 (explaining that "the time drain of campaign­
ing has, one assumes, become more pressing in recent years"). 
42. See Carrington & Long, supra note 17, at 474. A New York Times study 
showed that Supreme Court of Ohio justices routinely heard cases involving parties or 
amici who gave them campaign contributions. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Cam­
paign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 2006, at Al. Public 
confidence in judicial impartiality has also suffered as a result. In an important study 
by Justice at Stake, eighty-six percent of those surveyed expressed concern that "law­
yers are the biggest campaign contributors to judicial candidates, and they often ap­
pear in court before judges they've given money to." GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER 
RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 8 (2001 ), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/J ASN ationalSur 
veyResults_6F537F9927204.pdf. 
43. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributors and the Penn­
sylvania Supreme Court, 93 JUDICATURE 164 (2010). Other surveys have concluded 
that in many states, "nearly half of all supreme court cases involve someone who has 
given money to one or more of the judges hearing the case." James Sample, Democ­
racy at the Comer of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equal­
ity, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 749 (2011). 
44. In Caperton, the Court appeared to recognize that the independent expenditures, 
like direct contributions, by one of the litigants to help a judge's campaign could 
create an intolerable probability of bias; in fact, the Court repeatedly referred to the 
independent expenditures in the case as "contributions." Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-86 (2009). This blurring surprised election law scholars 
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Caperton is the prototypical example. When it came time to elect 
a justice to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Don 
Blankenship, whose company is a frequent litigant in front of that 
court, was the biggest spender in the judicial election. And despite 
Justice Kennedy's repeated claims that Caperton is unique, extreme, 
and unusual, that is simply not the case. In fact, the Caperton situation 
is quite common.45 And it is no stretch to believe that a judge hearing 
a case involving a contributor would feel a debt of gratitude toward 
that individual-indeed, to feel otherwise would defy bedrock social 
norms.46 In addition, with the next election always just around the 
corner,47 an elected judge must always be thinking about whether the 
because the Court, since Buckley v. Valeo, had sustained a bright-line distinction be­
tween independent expenditures and contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 
79 (1976) (recognizing a constitutionally significant difference between independent 
expenditures and direct campaign contributions). Although the Caperton Court does 
not expressly recognize that independent expenditures in judicial elections are inher­
ently corrupting in the sense that they could be banned consistent with the First 
Amendment, the Court appears to acknowledge that "there are circumstances in which 
independent expenditures have the same potential to corruptly influence the actions of 
elected officials as contributions." Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REv. 
1644, 1656 (2012). 
45. For example, just a few years earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court heard Avery v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). Avery was 
an appeal of a one-billion-dollar verdict against State Farm. While the case was pend­
ing, Illinois held its election for a seat on the state supreme court. The candidates for 
that seat received a record $9.3 million in campaign contributions. JAMES SAMPLE ET 
AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETnNG RECUSAL STANDARDS 20-23 
(2008). Lloyd Karmeier won the election, having received hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in contributions from State Farm employees and lawyers. See Hale v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-0660-DRH, 2013 WL 1287054, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 
28, 2013). He then cast the deciding vote to overturn the verdict against State Farm. 
Id. The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Two other 
incidents involving the Ohio Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court are 
described by Roy Schotland in Comment on Professor Carrington's Article "The In­
dependence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio," 30 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 489, 493-94 (2002). 
46. See Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance of Impropri­
ety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions on 
Judges' Decisions, 26 J.L. & PoL. 359, 366 (2011) (discussing the "reciprocity princi­
ple," which is the notion that once an individual benefits from an action of another it 
is expected that the recipient of the benefit return the favor). The Supreme Court cited 
this commonsense intuition in Caperton. See 556 U.S. at 882 ("Though not a bribe or 
criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to 
Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected."). 
47. Elected state court judges generally serve shorter terms than appointed judges. 
This is particularly true of lower state court judges, who typically serve relatively 
short terms of four to eight years. See Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minne­
sota v. White: Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, 41 JunGEs' J. 7, 10 (2002) 
(discussing the effect of short terms for judges on judicial independence). For an ex­
cellent discussion on the interrelationship between judicial independence, accountabil-
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same contributor would support his or her next election bid, which is 
likely to be more expensive given the trend in spending in judicial 
elections. 
2. Broken Promises 
The second bias-inducing transformation of judicial elections has 
to do with the evolution of judicial campaigns and the candidates' 
conduct during those campaigns. In pre-1980s judicial elections, 
judges were seldom seen and even more seldom heard, rarely appear­
ing on the campaign trail.48 Because the public rarely paid attention to 
judicial elections, there was simply no need to discuss any substantive 
legal issues.49 
Even judges who wanted to campaign were very limited in what 
they could say on the campaign trail. Ethics codes, as well as customs 
and tradition, prevented judges from speaking out on substantive is­
sues that would likely need to be resolved by the judiciary.50 That all 
changed with Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White. There, the Su­
preme Court struck down a portion of Minnesota's Code of Judicial 
Conduct that prohibited judges from announcing their views on issues 
that were likely to arise in front of the Court.51 The First Amendment, 
Justice Scalia explained, does not allow a state to impose such a broad 
restriction on a candidate's speech.52 If a state chooses to select its 
ity, and the length of judicial terms, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of 
Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEo. L.J. 
1349 (2010). 
48. Pozen, supra note 12, at 297 (describing how "[c]ampaigning was minimal[,] 
incumbents almost always won[, and] few people voted or cared" in judicial elections 
of the past). 
49. Id. 
50. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 
38 AKRON L. REv. 625, 629-32 (2005) (discussing the regulation of judicial cam­
paign speech before the Supreme Court's decision in White). 
51. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
52. Id. Although the challenge in White concerned only the "announce clause" of 
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, similar challenges to other restrictions on 
judicial candidate speech are being heard by the lower courts, including pledges or 
promises clauses (banning "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the 
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office"), commit clauses (ban­
ning "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court"), and misrepresent 
clauses (banning judicial candidates from knowingly misrepresenting facts concerning 
themselves or an opponent). See, e.g., Pa. Family Inst. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 
2007) (concerning a challenge to a "pledges or promises clause" set forth in Penn­
sylvania's judicial ethics rules); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 56 F. Supp. 3d 884 (E.D. Ky. 
2014) (prohibition on misleading statements and misrepresentations); Carey v. 
Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2012 WL 4597236 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2012) (commit 
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judges by elections, candidates for the judicial office must have the 
right to announce their positions during the campaign. 53 
As a result, judges frequently take office having expressed their 
position on a number of controversial issues. In part, they do so be­
cause special interest groups frequently send judicial candidates ques­
tionnaires seeking their views on whatever issues are of interest to 
those particular groups.54 Voters now expect judicial candidates to 
take positions on issues that they will face. 55 For example, because 
criminal law issues are so salient in judicial campaigns, many judges 
have promised to be tough on crime.56 
Why might this be problematic? As the dissenters in White ex­
plained, a judge taking office having made certain promises to the 
electorate-or even simply having announced her views on controver­
sial issues that are likely to arise-might feel undue pressure to live up 
to those promises.57 Although there are no studies demonstrating a 
conclusive link between statements made during judicial campaigns 
and judicial decisions in office, common sense and human nature sug­
gest that judges consider the promises they have made in deciding 
cases.58 As California's former Chief Justice Ronald George ex­
plained, "When a candidate for judicial office speaks during an elec­
tion campaign about his or her views on issues that may come before 
the court, voters reasonably will anticipate that he or she will render 
clause). The Supreme Court recently upheld Florida's ban on direct solicitation by 
judges. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
53. Of course, a state is not required to elect its judges, and there are a variety of 
modes of election or appointment adopted by the states for different judgeships. See 
Am. Bar Ass'n, Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
54. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23, at 734. 
55. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Navigating the Path of the Supreme Appoint­
ment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 537, 577 (2011) ("[V]oters now expect state judicial 
candidates to express their views on topics such as gay and lesbian rights, abortion 
rights, school prayer, and religious displays."). 
56. See Swisher, supra note 6, at 327-38. 
57. Republican Party ofMinn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The dissenters point out that the concern about appearance of impartiality is the rea­
son why Supreme Court Justices rarely make any substantive comments in the course 
of their confirmation hearings, even though they do not have to face confirmation 
again. Id. at 800, 807 n.l. 
58. It is not unusual for a politician to be criticized heavily for breaking a campaign 
promise. One of the most famous examples is George H.W. Bush's promise of "no 
new taxes." See, e.g., Z. Bryan Wolf, Six Things Presidents Wish They Hadn't Said, 
CNN (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/l l/02/politics/obama-read-my-lips­
moment/. 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
642 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:631 
decisions in accordance with those personal views."59 Left unsaid in 
Chief Justice George's statement are the implications for judicial deci­
sion-making: if voters expect a judge to rule in accordance with the 
judge's campaign statements, the judge is likely to be concerned about 
being perceived as breaking those promises. In other words, a judge 
deciding a case involving an issue on which the judge campaigned 
might be biased in favor of the previously announced views precisely 
because of those earlier statements.60 
3. The Majoritarian Difficulty 
But there is an even greater concern. In an influential 1995 arti­
cle, Professor Steven Croley coined the term "majoritarian diffi­
culty."61 The term refers to the idea that an elected judge hearing a 
case would be tempted to decide the case according to the preferences 
of the majority (i.e., the people who will decide whether the judge 
remains in the job), even if doing so is contrary to the law. 62 Because 
judges often have wide latitude in reaching legal decisions, it would 
not be a willful misapplication of the law to "impose an undeservedly 
harsh sentence on a criminal defendant or find an out-of-state corpora­
tion liable to a class of state citizens, despite weak evidence of wrong­
doing."63 When a reading an ambiguous statute or interpreting a vague 
constitutional provision, a judge may be tempted to choose a more 
popular reading to appease the electorate. 64 
59. Ronald M. George, Foreword: Achieving Impaniality in State Courts, 91 CA­
LIF. L. REv. 1853, 1861 (2009). Chief Justice George criticizes the practice of an­
nouncing views on controversial issues because "it may well be misleading for 
candidates for judicial office to provide information concerning their individual views 
during a campaign, because doing so in such a context suggests that the judge will 
conform to those views regardless of the state of the law." Id. at 1862. 
60. For a discussion of the obligation to keep promises, see generally CHARLES 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS A PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 19 
(1981); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 296 (1998). 
61. Croley, supra note 25, at 693. The majoritarian difficulty is the counter to Alex­
ander Bickel's famous countermajoritarian difficulty, which has been at the heart of 
all constitutional theory. Id.; see also Barry Friedman, The Binh of an Academic 
Obsession: The History of the Countennajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE 
L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
62. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23, at 731 ("[E]lective judiciaries pose a risk to 
the rule of law, which is compromised whenever a judge's ruling is influenced by 
majority preferences."). 
63. Id. at 723. 
64. Id. (hypothesizing that "elected judges will succumb to the pressure to decide 
close cases as the majority of the electorate would prefer, rather than as the law re­
quires"). Judges admit that such factors enter their decision-making. See Paul Rei­
dinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987). Justice Scalia once 
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But just as with money and promises, the majoritarian difficulty 
was at one time only difficult in theory. Judicial elections historically 
had such low salience that elected judges had little reason to tailor 
their decisions to public opinion. Incumbents often ran unopposed, 
and even when they faced a challenger, they almost always won.65 
Unlike elections for other elected offices, judges could feel safe in 
their job, knowing that nobody was watching. 
That has all changed in recent years. As judicial elections have 
become more competitive, individual rulings face closer scrutiny and 
pose a greater risk to a judges' careers.66 As Justice Otto Klaus fa­
mously remarked, "There's no way a judge is going to be able to ig­
nore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or 
she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring 
a crocodile in your bathtub."67 In recent years, a number of judges 
have either lost elections as a result of unpopular decisions or 
squeaked out narrow victories after unpopular decisions were used 
against them by challengers. Recently, three justices of the Iowa Su­
preme Court were voted out of office for their controversial decision 
to strike down a state statute defining marriage as between a man and 
a woman.68 On average, of course, incumbents are still likely to win 
their reelection, but the job is no longer safe for a sitting judge.69 And 
quipped that "[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power." McConnell v. 
Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
65. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 2047, 2051 (2010) ("Under the traditional model of judicial elections ... 
incumbents almost always won."). 
66. See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections 
("Sitting judges facing an imminent election ... know that every decision is poten­
tially fodder for the opposition. When well-heeled or well-organized interest groups 
can seize on isolated opinions-even well-reasoned decisions that have been joined 
by a majority of other judges on the court-as the basis for attack ads in the next 
campaign, it takes extraordinary integrity and real courage for a judge facing reelec­
tion to support a ruling that plainly will be unpopular."), in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE 
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 75 
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections 
Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 11 I CoLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 27, 
33 (2011) ("[P]ast judicial elections have taught that justices can be ousted due to 
their vote in a single case on one of these topics, often a vote portrayed incorrectly or 
deceptively by the opposition campaign or interest group."). 
67. Reidinger, supra note 64, at 58. 
68. See Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of 
Three Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 715 (2011). 
69. Some estimate the judicial election races are now at least as competitive as 
races for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme 
Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. PoL. 
SCI. REv. 315, 319 (2001) ("The fact of the matter ... is that supreme court justices 
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as judicial elections become more and more competitive, pressures to 
impress the voting public at all costs will continue to increase. 
B. Evidence of Bias 
So far, we have only shown that judicial elections-in particular, 
the modern judicial elections characterized by high spending, more 
substantive judicial campaigns, and greater levels of competition­
create the potential for judicial bias. But perhaps judges can ignore 
these temptations and act impartially once they reach the bench. After 
all, in the words of Blackstone, "[t]he law will not suppose a possibil­
ity of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer 
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that pre­
sumption and idea."70 Testifying in support of Justice Alito's confir­
mation to the United States Supreme Court, Third Circuit Judge 
Edward Becker explained: "The public doesn't understand what hap­
pens to you when you become a judge. When you take that judicial 
oath, you become a different person."71 
As comforting as Judge Becker's testimony sounds, common 
sense tells us it is Pollyannaish in the extreme. After all, judges are 
human beings subject to the same temptations and influences as the 
rest of us.72 A number of recent studies have confirmed that this com­
monsense intuition is indeed correct. On the whole, these studies show 
that elected judges are biased, and these biases run precisely along the 
lines we expected: in favor of the interests that can help judges be 
reelected (e.g., donors) and against the interests that cannot (out-of­
state parties). Certain disfavored litigants, including criminal defen­
dants, fare poorly across a number of dimensions and across 
jurisdictions. 
face competition that is, by two of three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for 
the U.S. House."). 
70. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361. 
71. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Asso­
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, I09th Cong. 655-56 (2006) (statement of Judge Edward Becker). 
72. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 829 
(2001) (demonstrating "that judges rely on the same cognitive decision-making pro­
cess as laypersons and other experts, which leaves them vulnerable to cognitive illu­
sions that can produce poor judgments"); Daniel Hinkle, Cynical Realism and Judicial 
Fantasy, 5 WASH. U. JuR1s. REV. 289, 297 (2013) ("[J]udges are humans who are 
subject to the same biases and flaws that all humans are susceptible of when making 
decisions."). 
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Perhaps most concerning, the studies show that judges over­
whelmingly rule in favor of their campaign contributors.73 Every dol­
lar a litigant spends on a judicial election increases the likelihood that 
the judge will rule in that litigant's favor.74 This is especially true if 
one of the parties (or its lawyers) made a significant contribution to 
the judge's campaign.75 And even when both sides contributed to a 
judge's campaign, the party that contributed more fares better.76 
The studies also show that judges are biased against out-of-state 
defendants. One study showed that the average damages award was 
$150,000 higher against out-of-state defendants. 77 Of course, this re­
distribution of wealth to in-state litigants is entirely rational-taking 
care of the local donors and voters takes priority.78 In the words of 
West Virginia Justice Richard Neely, "As long as I am allowed to 
redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state 
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. . . . [M]y job security [is en­
hanced], because in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends 
will reelect me."79 
If we tum our attention to criminal cases, the situation is no bet­
ter. As judicial elections get closer, elected judges tend to sentence 
73. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An 
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 69 (2011); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case 
Study ofArbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002); Margaret 
S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys' 
Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JusT. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007) (concluding 
that some Wisconsin judges tend to rule in favor of contributors); see also Liptak & 
Roberts, supra note 42 (concluding that Supreme Court of Ohio justices ruled in favor 
of their contributors more than seventy percent of the time). 
74. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 73, at 73 ("We find that every dollar of contribu­
tions from business groups is associated with increases in the probability that elected 
judges will decide for business litigants."). 
75. Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Cam­
paign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. Om. MERCY L. REV. 385, 
386 (2008). 
76. Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal ofAmerican Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Risk ofActual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign 
Contributors, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 3, 8 (2010). 
77. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of 
Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 157, 163 (1999) (concluding that elected judges fre­
quently redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state plaintiffs). 
78. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial 
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 273, 289 
(2002) (stating that an elected judge may rationally favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote 
and have friends and relatives who vote, over out-of-state corporations). 
79. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988). 
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criminal defendants more harshly.80 And when that sentence is the 
death penalty, an elected judge is much more likely to sentence a de­
fendant to death when judicial elections are close.81 One study found 
that "criminal defendants [convicted of murder] were approximately 
15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the sentence was is­
sued during the judge's election year."82 None of this comes as a sur­
prise, as criminal justice issues figure prominently in contested 
judicial elections. 83 
And regardless of the type of case, empirical evidence seems to 
support the intuition of the majoritarian difficulty. A number of stud­
ies by Joanna Shepherd and others demonstrate that elected judges 
tend to decide cases at least partly in accordance with the preference 
of the electorate.84 According to Shepherd, "[W]hen judges face [con­
servative electorates] in partisan reelections, they are more likely to 
[rule] for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, 
for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for businesses 
in products liability cases, for original defendants in tort cases, and 
against criminals in criminal appeals."85 Admittedly, every judge 
without life tenure must consider retention politics,86 but elected 
judges do it at a significantly higher level than appointed judges. 
Finally, three relevant groups also believe that judicial decisions 
are influenced by the election process. First, judges confirm that they 
take electoral considerations into account when making legal judg­
80. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: ls 
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. PoL. Set. 247, 258 (2004) (finding 
that "all judges, even the most punitive, increase their sentences as reelection nears"). 
81. Richard W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRtMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002) (explaining that "criminal defendants [convicted 
of murder] were approximately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the 
sentence was issued during the judge's election year"). 
82. Id. 
83. See Croley, supra note 25, at 734-75 (1995) (citing an increase in the number 
of elections where an incumbent judge loses because of criminal justice issues); cf 
Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a 
Bellwether State, 39 W1LLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (explaining that even 
advocates of tort reform frequently pay for appeals to criminal justice issues because 
those issues are more salient for voters). 
84. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 
J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 (2009) ("The evidence supports the widespread belief that 
judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected ...."). 
85. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 661. 
86. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1589 (2009). In other words, even judges who are reappointed by the governor or the 
state legislature seem to exhibit biases toward those reappointing agents. 
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ments.87 In one study, more than twenty-five percent of the respon­
dents believed that contributions have at least "some influence" on 
judicial decisions; approximately fifty percent thought the contribu­
tions have at least "a little influence."88 Second, the contributors be­
lieve that their contributions make a difference. 89 And finally, 
approximately eighty percent of the public thought that judges were 
biased in favor of their contributors.90 A similar percentage thought 
that judicial decisions were influenced by political considerations.91 
While public, or even judicial, opinions do not alone prove that judges 
are indeed biased, it shows that judicial elections create a strong ap­
pearance of bias, and that in itself is a problem for the judiciary.92 
II. 
THE PROMISE OF RECUSAL 
The substantial risk-not to mention empirical evidence-of ju­
dicial bias stemming from elections is deeply troubling. The Supreme 
Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires judges to be im­
partial.93 In fact, all other rights and constitutional protections, as well 
87. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 
77 JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994) (concluding that "[e]ven though judges rarely lose 
retention elections and only 34.9 percent believe a poor judge will be voted out, still 
three-fifths believe judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial 
behavior"); Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent 
Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
839, 842 (1994) ("Judges admit that they cannot completely trust themselves to hold 
in check the threats to their independence presented by judicial elections."). 
88. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE & AM. 
VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE-STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 5 
(2002 ), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/ems/JASJudgesSurveyResul ts_EA 
8838C0504A5.pdf. 
89. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF 
CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL EI.EcnoNs 4-7 (2010), https://www.brennancenter. 
org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn= 1 (sum­
marizing evidence demonstrating that judicial campaign contributors believe that their 
spending influences judicial decisions). 
90. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 43 
(2003). 
91. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CouRTS, How THE PUBLIC Vrnws THE STATE CoURTs: 
A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 41 (1999), http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/243/ 
urlt/publicop_natl.pdf. 
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881 (8th Cir. 2001) 
("The governmental interest in an independent and impartial judiciary is matched by 
its equally important interest in preserving public confidence in that independence and 
impartiality."). 
93. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding that a judge violates 
due process when he has a financial interest to rule against one of the parties). Of 
course, every judge has some biases, and we simply have to accept some of them. 
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as the adversarial system itself, hinge on the idea that a judge acts as 
an impartial decision-maker.94 If, as the evidence suggests, our elected 
state judges are not truly impartial, the implication for the rule of law 
is troubling, to say the least. 
So how can judicial impartiality be bolstered in the state courts? 
For most legal academics, the best solution appears to be the elimina­
tion of judicial elections.95 In the colorful words of Roy Schotland, 
"[M]ore sweat and ink have been spent on getting rid of judicial elec­
tions than on any other single subject in the history of American 
law."96 But judicial elections remain popular among the people, and it 
seems highly unlikely that states will revert back to an appointive judi­
ciary any time soon.97 
Drawing a line between proper and improper biases is a difficult, if not impossible, 
exercise. But there are some biases that are clearly improper: relationship with one of 
the parties, one of the parties holds the keys to the judge's job, debt, favors, or other 
motivators. As Professor Leubsdorf explained in an influential article, "One can 
scarcely advance the ideal of judicial impartiality without feeling doubts. We all take 
it for granted that personal values and assumptions help shape every judge's deci­
sions." John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 237-38 (1987). See also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudi­
catory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 
492 (1986) (acknowledging that reality of human nature "forces us to tolerate some 
bias"). Justice Scalia's opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White notes that 
complete judicial impartiality, in the sense of the judicial mind as a "tabula rasa," is 
neither required nor desired. 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002). The judge's experiences, 
views, and upbringing may influence the judge's decision without running afoul of 
due process. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE Jumc1AL PROCESS 168 
( 1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not tum aside 
in their course, and pass the judges by."). 
94. See Monroe Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1060, 1065 (1975) ("[The adversarial] system proceeds on the assumption that the 
best way to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial judge or jury a confronta­
tion between the proponents of conflicting views, assigning to each the task of mar­
shalling and presenting the evidence for its side in as thorough and persuasive a way 
as possible."). 
95. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's 
Perspective, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 13, 41 (2003) ("There is widespread dissatisfaction 
today with the operation of judicial elections."); Geyh, supra note 90, at 72-79 (argu­
ing for the elimination of judicial elections); Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State 
Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 
212 (1996) (concluding that compliance with due process requires the elimination of 
judicial elections). But see CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE 
OF JumCIAL ELECTIONS (2009) (arguing in favor of judicial elections); Michael R. 
Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges-Except All the Others that Have 
Been Tried, 32 N. Kv. L. REV. 267 (2005). 
96. Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 L. & CoN­
TEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (J 998). 
97. Approximately eighty percent of the public favors judicial elections. See Geyh, 
supra note 90, at 52-53. 
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Some scholars have argued that judicial elections are not just 
problematic but are also unconstitutional. The argument has been most 
powerfully made by Professor Martin Redish, who has written that the 
use of judicial elections violates due process.98 While the argument 
has some logical force, the Supreme Court has given no indication that 
it would entertain such an idea. To the contrary, Justice Scalia's opin­
ion in White strongly suggested that because judicial elections have 
co-existed with the Due Process Clause for well over a century, any 
arguments that judicial elections violate the due process guarantee of 
impartiality are likely to fail.99 Indeed, judicial elections have become 
so engrained in the fabric of this nation that it is difficult to imagine 
any court striking the institution down as a whole. 
If elections are here to stay, then we are stuck with our current 
approach to judicial bias. 100 That approach centers on recusal. As most 
commonly formulated, if a judge is biased or if there is an appearance 
98. Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with 
State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular 
Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARYL. REV. I, 2 (2014); Redish & Marshall, supra 
note 93, at 498 (finding that "the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear 
violation of procedural due process" in at least some cases). 
99. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002) (explaining that 
the dissenting justices' "election-nullifying" views are not "reflected in the Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has coexisted with the election of 
judges ever since it was adopted"). 
JOO. There are, perhaps, two other alternatives. The first is to maintain judicial elec­
tions, but eliminate the factors that contribute to judicial bias. For example, some 
scholars have argued that rules for judicial elections should differ from the rules for 
other elections because of the due process concerns for litigants that will eventually 
argue before the elected judges. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint 
and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J.L. Eru1cs 1059, I 060 (1996). But in White, 
the Supreme Court largely ignored that suggestion, opting instead for a unilocular "an 
election is an election" approach. The Court's recent decision in Williams-Yulee, how­
ever, slightly opens the door to such arguments and suggests that perhaps the Court 
would allow some regulations of judicial elections that would be unconstitutional in 
any other election. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding 
Florida's ban on personal solicitations of campaign funds by judicial candidates). 
The second alternative is to implement some softer solutions: greater education 
of the public about the judicial role, testing and education of judicial candidates about 
bias, including, inter alia, unconscious and subconscious bias. See, e.g., Raymond J. 
McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of Judicial 
Ethics: Lessons from "Big Judge Davis," 99 KY. L.J. 259, 295-324 (2011) (sug­
gesting such strategies). I, too, have written about creating a more informed electorate, 
with the hope that this would lead judges to be less fearful about losing their jobs 
based on individual unpopular decisions. See Dmitry Barn, Voter Ignorance and Judi­
cial Elections, 102 Kv. L.J. 553 (2014). While I continue to believe these efforts are 
important, such efforts permit the sources of bias to continue and are unlikely to be 
entirely adequate. 
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of bias, the judge must step aside. 101 This was not always the case. 
Under British common law and at the time of the Founding, recusal 
was required only when the judge had a financial stake in the outcome 
of the case. 102 But Congress passed America's first recusal statute 
early in this nation's history, and that statute has been revised and 
expanded a number of times over the last 225 years. 103 Since then, 
recusal has become the central feature of judicial ethics codes, 104 as 
well as state recusal statutes. 105 In short, at both the state and federal 
levels, recusal is our solution to the bias problem. 
Scholars have clung to recusal as a potentially viable solution to 
the problem of judicial bias. Some have argued that recusal is "the 
only effective means to ensure the impartiality of elected judges"106 
and that "recusal reform offers an effective, constitutional means of 
solving" the judicial bias problem that results from judicial elec­
tions.107 In fact, recusal can arguably be "precisely targeted to 
preventing due process problems . . . without restricting campaign 
speech at all."108 In the last decade, and especially since the Caperton 
decision, recusal has been a frequent topic in law journals. 109 
101. See, e.g., TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (2002). See generally 
Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Re­
form, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151 (2011) (reviewing the recusal codes and statutes in 
all fifty states). 
102. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 663 
(2005) ("[H]istorically, the only basis for recusal was financial interest."). 
103. See Dmitry Barn, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of 
Bias, 2011 BYU L. REv. 943, 943 (discussing the evolution of the federal recusal 
statutes). 
104. See, e.g., CoNN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (2011); N.M. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 21-400 (2010). 
105. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 51-39 (West 2015); LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. 
ANN. art. 151 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (2015). 
106. Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judi­
ciary, 42 Lav. LA. L. REv. 671, 692 (2009) (emphasis added). 
107. David K. Stott, 'Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Im­
partiality Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REv. 481, 482; see also Grannis, 
supra note 9, at 415 (explaining that recusal is "a manageable solution to the problem 
of possible judicial bias"). 
I 08. Friedland, supra note 22, at 568-70. 
109. See, e.g., James M. Anderson et al., Measuring How Stock Ownership Affects 
Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163 (2015); Debra Lyn Bas­
sett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 lowAL. REv. 181 
(2011); Kang & Shepherd, supra note 16; Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal? 
Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal 
Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177 (2015). See generally Correy Stephenson, Legal 
Ethics a Hot Topic in 2011, Wis. L.J. (Dec. 28, 2011, 10: 11 AM), http://wislawjour 
nal.com/2011/12/28/legal-ethics-a-hot-topic-in-2011/. 
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Judges, too, have suggested that recusal can be a remedy to the 
election-related bias problem. In his White concurrence, Justice Ken­
nedy endorsed more stringent recusal standards as one acceptable 
means of preserving judicial impartiality. 110 In other words, to the ex­
tent that judicial campaigning endorsed by the Court's decision in 
White creates either bias or the appearance of bias, Justice Kennedy 
explained that stricter recusal standards can eliminate that problem. 
Lower court judges have echoed Kennedy's sentiment, 111 suggesting 
that to the extent that judicial elections lead to judicial bias, the recusal 
mechanism is in place to ensure that the case will be heard by an 
impartial arbiter. 
Then came Caperton, and once again the Supreme Court offered 
recusal as the proposed remedy to judicial bias. Caperton held a great 
deal of promise. Here was the Court-a majority this time-giving 
some constitutional bite to recusal and perhaps even expanding the 
meaning of due process. 112 As an indication of Caperton' s potential 
impact, the dissent fretted that recusal would become too powerful a 
tool in the hands of wily lawyers, who would abuse the recusal proce­
dure for their advantage. 11 3 
This focus on recusal is not surprising. Recusal has tremendous 
allure because, in theory, it allows us to ensure judicial impartiality at 
the point of delivery. If recusal works to remedy election-related judi­
cial bias, then states can continue with the practice of judicial elec­
tions and judicial candidates can have robust freedom of speech. Our 
methods of judicial selection and pre-judicial experiences of American 
judges do seem to require a post hoc remedy. Unlike judges through­
out much of the rest of the world, American judges largely come from 
practice. 114 Many are well-known lawyers and members of their com­
110. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
111. See, e.g., Family Tr. Found. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 702 (E.D. Ky. 
2004) (contending that judges whose impartiality could be questioned because of 
campaign promises could be required to recuse themselves under the state code of 
judicial conduct); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 763 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
112. Gerard J. Clark, Caperton 's New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. 
REV. 661, 661 (2010) ("In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the United States Su­
preme Court expanded the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...." 
(citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009))). 
113. In his Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts predicted a flood of recusal mo­
tions relying on the majority's reasoning. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 902 (Roberts, CJ., 
dissenting). As it turned out, however, Chief Justice Roberts's predictions have been 
unfulfilled. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After 
Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229 (2010). 
114. See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE B1As IN THE AMERI­
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010). 
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munities, having established strong bonds with other lawyers and cli­
ents in the community. 115 As a result, American judges are more 
likely to come to the bench with biases and connections-even aside 
from the electoral influences-that recusal can remedy. Or can it? We 
tum to that question next. 
III. 
A BROKEN PROMISE 
Because our constitutional guarantee of judicial impartiality 
hinges greatly on the success of the recusal statutes and ethical rules 
regulating judicial disqualification, the critical question is this: can 
recusal remedy the judicial bias problem? I believe the answer is no. 
In this Article, I want to highlight two potential reasons. The first is 
the self-recusal procedure that is followed in most states. The second 
is that recusal simply does not work when it comes to fixing systemic 
bias stemming from the election process. 
A. Self-Recusal Procedure 
One major reason why recusal has failed is the self-recusal proce­
dure. In most states, as in the federal courts, judges decide their own 
recusal motions. 116 This recusal procedure has been followed through­
out the United States since the time of the Founding and was followed 
in England for centuries before that. 117 While there are some excep­
tions, the judge's decision usually is final, subject only to appellate 
review. That appellate review, however, is generally highly deferential 
to the judge's decision, and reversals are rare. 11 8 
This self-recusal procedure is particularly inappropriate when it 
comes to addressing election-related judicial bias for several reasons. 
First, in the course of their campaigns, candidates for judicial office 
make all sorts of statements, announcements, and promises. 119 In the 
next election, voters are likely to expect the judge to have some record 
as to the category of cases where the judge made promises before. As 
115. Id. 
116. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 
448 (2014). 
117. See John A. Meiser, The (Non)problem ofa Limited Due Process Right to Judi­
cial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1799, 1803 (2009) ("[O]ur recusal 
procedures grew out of English common law practice."). 
118. Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. 
REv. 1951, 1990 (2013) (observing that "self-recusal decisions are reviewed deferen­
tially and rarely reversed on appeal"). 
119. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
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a result, we might expect judges to hesitate before disqualifying them­
selves from cases involving issues about which they had campaigned 
(and, presumably, the issues that voters care about most). 120 Judges 
who recuse themselves in cases that the voters care about most might 
find themselves out of a job.121 
The second reason why the self-recusal procedure is ill-suited to 
addressing election-related judicial bias is that judges might feel that 
recusing themselves for their campaign statements and conduct would 
imply that the campaigning itself had been improper. 122 In addition, 
the ethics codes require judges to recuse sua sponte, meaning that 
recusal motions put judges in a difficult spot: "a successful motion to 
recuse requires the [judge] to admit that he failed in the first instance 
to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements." 123 Even an unbiased 
judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is biased. 124 
Third, the self-recusal procedure is least effective particularly 
when it is needed most. Take, for example, the situation where a judge 
is biased in favor of a contributor to the judge's previous election. 125 
120. See James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regulation: Integrity or Incen­
tives?, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769, 775 (2006) ("[l]f a judge is required to recuse 
himself on all issues related to his campaign promises, 'the voters do not get what 
they believe they were promised.'"). While there have been few studies of voter ex­
pectations in judicial elections, studies of candidates running for office in other elec­
tions suggest that those candidates expect voters to evaluate them based on their 
record in office. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE Lorne OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
72-76 (1990) (arguing that voters evaluate the probability that a candidate will choose 
a voter-preferred policy based on an evaluation of the candidate's records). 
121. In fact, some have argued that requiring recusal under these circumstances un­
dermines the purpose of judicial elections. Why have elections, the argument goes, if 
any substantive information that a candidate can provide to a voter about what they 
would do when in office disables the judge from doing what she promised? According 
to some scholars, providing voters with information about a judge, and then requiring 
the judge who provided the information to recuse from those cases, "work[s] a fraud 
on the voters." Shepard, supra note I 00, at 1076; see also Penny J. White, A Matter of 
Perspective, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 5, 63-75 (2004) (arguing that mandatory 
recusal rules might run afoul of First Amendment); Michael Zuckerman, Judicial 
Recusal and Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. 977, 1013 
(20 I I) ("If recusal burdens speech, then affording too much weight to a litigant's due 
process rights may infringe upon the presiding judge's right to speak outside the 
courtroom, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas."). 
122. This is similar to the rules problem of a judge who failed to recuse sua sponte. 
123. R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse?: Foreign Common law Gui­
dance and Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1799, 1833-34 (2005). 
124. James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, 
JuDGils' J., Winter 2007, at 17, 20. 
125. Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. 
REv. 699, 699 (1995) ("Ordinary rules of social interaction impose obligations of 
gratitude and loyalty on those who receive a significant benefit."). 
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Recusal eliminates the judge's ability to repay his debt of gratitude. 126 
And if a judge does recuse in every case involving that contributor, 
that contributor is likely to take his money elsewhere. As a result, the 
more biased the target judge is, the less likely that judge is to recuse 
himself. 127 In fact, in a New York Times study of judicial voting in the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, the Times found that in "the 215 cases with 
the most direct potential conflicts of interest, justices recused them­
selves just 9 times."12s 
Moreover, judges rarely recognize their own biases, or even the 
appearance of bias, because such bias is often subconscious. 129 
Caperton's Justice Benjamin, for example, was convinced that he was 
not biased, and presumably, since he did not recuse, that no one could 
perceive him as biased. 130 Modem research in cognitive psychology 
tells us why131 : the cognitive biases that affect judicial decisions make 
it impossible for judges to assess their own conduct dispassionately 
and open-mindedly. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the 
"bias blind spot."132 Everyone, including a judge, makes decisions in a 
manner skewed to favor their own self-interest and to view themselves 
126. In Caperton, the Supreme Court emphasized the debt of gratitude that Justice 
Benjamin owed to Don Blankenship as one of the reasons recusal was required under 
the Due Process Clause. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 
(2009). 
127. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 72. 
128. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 42. 
129. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1317, 1333 
(2006) ("Because so many biases operate on subconscious levels, it is often difficult 
for individuals to gauge the factors that may skew judgment."). The work of Jeffrey 
Rachlinkski, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie has demonstrated that judges suffer 
from similar unconscious biases as the general population. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
1195 (2009). 
130. Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Dis­
qualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LoUis U. PuB. L. 
REv. 235, 276 (2013) ("Justice Benjamin did what most of us do when evaluating our 
own biases-he succumbed to the Introspection Illusion, which confirmed his belief 
that he was not biased in this specific instance."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent 
Benjamin Now!?: Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 
SAN Dmoo L. REV. I, 55 (2010) (discussing the standards applied and conclusions 
reached by Justice Benjamin). 
131. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REv. 
913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of 
the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 133, 143-80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias). 
132. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus 
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. Buu,. 369, 370 (2002). 
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in the best light. 133 As a result of this tendency, people tend to think 
they are better than they actually are at a number of different tasks and 
on a number of different criteria, including fairness and ethics. 134 Spe­
cifically for purposes of this Article, judges overestimate their ability 
to remain impartial, ignoring the evidence of judicial bias. 135 
Making matters worse is that judges do not react well to requests 
for recusal. Many judges take offense when recusal motions are filed 
against them. 136 Michigan's experience with amending its recusal 
rules offers interesting insight. In 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court 
responded to Caperton by amending its court rules to permit the entire 
court to hear a party's disqualification motion if the challenged judge 
denied the motion in the first instance. 137 In a bitter dissent from the 
court's announcement of the procedural change, Justice Corrigan, on 
behalf of three justices, accused the four-justice majority of curtailing 
the fundamental freedoms of state judges and "depriv[ing] their co­
equal peers of their constitutionally protected interest in hearing 
cases." 138 This territoriality and personal pride is part of the reason 
why litigants are afraid of bringing recusal motions, and can lead a 
judge to extract vengeance on the moving litigant. 139 
And while shifting the recusal decision to another judge may fix 
the constitutional objections to the self-recusal procedure, such a shift 
is unlikely to be a panacea. Judges generally like each other and hesi­
133. See Ward Farnsworth, The legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DA­
v1s L. REV. 567, 570 (2003). 
134. David Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer than Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
Soc. PsvcHOL. 480 (1985). 
135. See Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of 
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519-20 (2009). Interestingly, judges 
are able to identify this bias in their colleagues but not in themselves. Most judges 
simply see themselves as "above average." Guthrie et al., supra note 72, at 814-15. 
136. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Jus­
tices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH1cs 375, 392 (2003) ("The case law is 
filled with descriptions of defensive and angry judges denying motions that they re­
cuse themselves."). 
137. M1cH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b). Prior to the change, the Michigan Supreme 
Court's recusal procedure was identical to that of the United States Supreme Court 
and that of nearly all the other state supreme courts. That is, each justice was in charge 
of his or her own recusal motion, without any oversight by his or her colleagues. See 
Jonathan Blitzer, Recusal Reform in Michigan, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusT. (July 31, 
2009), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/recusal-reform-michigan. 
138. Pelligrino v. Ampco Sys. Parking, 789 N.W.2d 777, 814 (Mich. 2010) (Corri­
gan, J., dissenting). 
139. Neumann, supra note 136, at 392 ("The case law is filled with descriptions of 
defensive and angry judges denying motions that they recuse themselves."); Sample & 
Pozen, supra note 124, at 17, 19 ("[L]itigants may be afraid of bringing recusal mo­
tions for fear of angering their judge."). 
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tate to impugn each others' ability to remain impartial. 14 ° Further­
more, no third party can decide whether another judge is actually 
biased without a true adversarial process in which both sides present 
evidence of the judge's state of mind. Recusal is a dispute between a 
judge and a litigant, and an adversarial process that allows those two 
sides to present their dispute to a neutral third party would be cumber­
some and inefficient. 141 
Of course, in Caperton itself the Supreme Court stepped in, al­
lowing us to hold this symposium. But the Court's involvement is 
unusual. It hears only eighty cases every year, so there is generally 
little to no oversight of state court decisions, let alone state court 
recusal decisions. This means that every time a Caperton issue 
arises-and it arises almost every day in courtrooms throughout the 
country142-it will likely be resolved by the very judge whose recusal 
is being sought. And the result is not likely to be any different from 
the result reached by Justice Benjamin. 
B. Recusal at the Wholesale Level 
Admittedly, in some circumstances, recusal works well. For ex­
ample, recusal is perfectly suited for a situation where we can identify 
a specific source of bias that a particular judge suffers from. If the 
source of bias is unique to the judge in question-perhaps the judge 
owns stock in one of the companies, or the judge is friendly with one 
of the parties, or the judge has personal knowledge of the facts of the 
case-then recusal is a perfect fit. 143 The sources of bias are objec­
tively identifiable, and other judges who do not suffer from the same 
bias may be found. Removing the biased judge from the case elimi­
nates the bias entirely .144 Moreover, a targeted prophylactic rule may 
140. Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 
87 IowA L. REv. 1213, 1237 (2002) (discussing the "resistance of other appellate 
judges to the idea of evaluating allegations of bias or prejudice against their col­
leagues"); Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias: The Standard 
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 (1973) ("Many courts are understand­
ably reluctant to disqualify a fellow judge since a finding of actual prejudice . . . 
impugns both that judge's qualifications and those of the system he represents."). 
141. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Proce­
dural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 107, 171 (2004) (discuss­
ing the efficiency concerns of third-party review of recusal decisions). 
142. Id. 
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2013) (listing specific circumstances when judicial dis­
qualification is required). 
144. For example, under§ 455(b), a judge must recuse if he has "personal knowl­
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Replacing that judge 
with one who does not have such "personal knowledge" alleviates the problem 
entirely. 
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prevent the biased judge from taking personal offense to a recusal mo­
tion, or can make recusal motions unnecessary since the grounds for 
recusal are objectively identifiable to any reasonable jurist. 
But for election-related bias, things are not so simple. The 
majoritarian difficulty affects every state judge who must run for re­
election. No judge is safe from the threat of losing the next election. 
Every judge must consider how her decisions will be characterized in 
the next election cycle or how potential contributors would react to the 
decision. And for this kind of bias, recusal is inadequate. Removing 
one judge who feels pressure to tailor her rulings toward a potential 
reelection bid and replacing her with another judge who feels identical 
pressure does little to ensure judicial impartiality. The case must still 
be heard by a judge-there is simply no way to get around that re­
quirement-and every judge will suffer from the same job-security 
biases. The majoritarian difficulty applies to all elected judges, not 
just those who received campaign contributions. 
In short, current recusal rules leave judges essentially immune 
from punishment for acting in a biased manner, 145 and when it comes 
to election-related judicial bias, recusal seems to be an inadequate so­
lution. And as judicial elections become more and more competitive 
and expensive, the bias problem will become worse and worse. 146 
CONCLUSION 
With every new study showing that elected judges are biased 
along a number of dimensions, the search for a solution gains addi­
tional urgency. Assuming judicial elections are here to stay and reform 
of judicial elections is forestalled by the Supreme Court's interpreta­
tion of the First Amendment, scholars must find new solutions to the 
problem of judicial bias. If judges are unable to check their own biases 
through recusal, then somebody else must act as such a check. The 
best recommendation so far has come from Amanda Frost and 
Stefanie Lindquist. 147 They suggest that the federal courts may be able 
to serve as a partial check on election-related judicial bias. This, of 
course, is true when it comes to questions of federal law, in particular 
constitutional rights. But that is an incomplete check. Most state law 
145. I am not suggesting that a draconian check is necessary. Cf. M.H. Hoeflich, 
Regulation ofJudicial Misconduct from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 L. 
& HlsT. REv. 79, 82 (1984) (discussing the approaches adopted throughout Europe in 
the seventh and eighth centuries, including liability to the aggrieved party-and some­
times even the crown-on judges who decided cases as a result of favoritism to the 
other party). 
146. See Pozen, supra note 12 (discussing this irony). 
147. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23. 
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decisions never reach the federal judiciary, either because of lack of 
resources or because they do not involve issues of federal law. The 
biases discussed in this Article take place in state trial courts. They are 
seen in the way that the courts decide summary judgment motions, 
motions to dismiss, and motions as a matter of law. Bias might per­
vade the awarding of damages in a bench trial, or ruling on objections 
in trial, or sentencing criminal defendants for violating state criminal 
law. In short, while turning to the federal courts as a check is a crea­
tive answer, it is woefully incomplete. 
Five years ago, Caperton was celebrated as an important victory 
for judicial impartiality. The Due Process Clause would stand as a 
check on judicial bias to ensure that election-related bias would not 
influence judicial decisions. But I am convinced that recusal is not the 
answer, and replacing one elected judge with another using the dis­
qualification procedure will not suffice. 
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